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Ethnonationalist triads
assessing the influence of Kin Groups on 
Civil Wars
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nationalism has the potential to transgress and transform state borders. irredentism represents the most radical form of 
border transformation, but border-transgressing effects, such as exter-
nal support by kin groups short of major military interventions, may 
also make ethnonationalist civil wars more likely. Given the highly 
asymmetric nature of such conflicts, which by definition feature non-
state groups challenging well-armed governments, it can be expected 
that the former will seek support from related groups in neighboring 
countries.
Even a quick look at the ethnopolitical map reveals that there are 
plenty of structural opportunities for such transborder influences. 
Whereas relatively few cases of outright irredentism have occurred, 
ethnonationalist civil wars have often featured external support from 
kin groups across state borders.1 Examples include Kurdish transborder 
cooperation against hostile state governments such as turkey and iraq.2 
transborder nationalism can also be blamed for having contributed to 
ethnic conflict in Croatia, Bosnia, Kosovo, and other parts of the for-
mer Yugoslavia.3 although the russian “near abroad” that emerged in 
the post–cold war period has generally been more peaceful than ex-
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pected, tensions persist that could be exploited to poison ethnic politics 
in the post-soviet republics.4
despite the existence of a rich case-based literature documenting 
the impact of kin groups on ethnonationalist civil wars, we still know 
little about their general effect on the likelihood of internal conflict. 
Quantitative studies of civil war onset have thus far tended to ignore 
such connections. this is the result of two blind spots, one relating 
to overaggregation and the other to underaggregation. regarding the 
first problem, influential studies in the political economy tradition have 
relied heavily on materialist interpretations of civil wars at the country 
level while downplaying specific interactions involving ethnic groups. 
the second blind spot pertains to the inclination of existing research 
on civil war to treat civil wars as purely domestic phenomena. since re-
searchers have assumed that civil wars take place within societies, they 
assume as well that the key causes of conflict must also be found within 
the boundaries of formally independent nation-states. they thus disre-
gard the role of transborder linkages and processes.
in order to capture the ethnic-kin effect at both the domestic and 
the transnational levels of analysis, we propose a triadic model that 
analyzes ethnonationalist civil war as a disaggregated, relational phe-
nomenon that includes links across state borders. Based on new data 
from geographic information systems, we show that ethnic kin have a 
discernible impact on internal conflict within a sample limited to Eur-
asia and northern africa. rather than being an unconditional effect, 
this influence depends directly on the dyadic power balance between 
the main conflict parties. in brief, the presence of external kin who 
could potentially offer support is more likely to increase the risk of 
conflict when the excluded minority is relatively large. this suggests 
that relatively smaller groups are less likely to rebel and that the poten-
tial assisting transborder kin groups tend to exercise caution: they give 
serious consideration to power relations before deciding whether to get 
involved in a conflict across the border. in contrast, there are no clear 
results indicating that the governmental or nongovernmental status of 
external kin groups matters for conflict propensity.
the next section charts the state of the literature before deriving 
our main hypotheses. the section following that, on operational defini-
tions, then sets the stage for the analysis and our statistical results.
 ethnonationalist triads 405
5  For example, Posen 1993; and hardin 1995.
6  Weiner 1971.
7  Weiner 1971, 683.
8  Brubaker 1996.
9  horowitz 1985.
previous research on the ethnic-Kin effect and its  
impact on conflict
the qualitative literature on ethnicity and nationalism provides rich ac-
counts of border-transgressing processes involving support across state 
borders. Whereas some studies of ethnic conflict following the cold 
war relied on dyadic actor constellations under anarchy,5 the border-
transgressing nature of ethnonationalism has been fully appreciated by 
scholars who rely on explicit theories of nationalism.
in a classic article, myron Weiner identifies a “macedonian syn-
drome” that involves an actor constellation featuring an irredentist state, 
an anti-irredentist neighboring state, and a shared ethnic group that is 
a minority in the latter state.6 Based on this triadic setup, Weiner out-
lines an interactive process triggered by irredentist claims on the part of 
the minority that leads to growing ethnonationalist polarization. once 
all actors have aligned themselves along the relevant ethnonationalist 
cleavage, extremist entrepreneurs, creating and responding to real or 
imagined threats, come to dominate politics within each of the three 
collective units, with political violence the likely consequence. Viewing 
his model as a corrective to country-level analysis, Weiner concludes 
that “too many theories of development assume constancy or irrele-
vancy as far as the international environment is concerned, and assume 
also that internal political development or decay occur without regard 
to external factors.”7
Extending this perspective to less drastic situations than outright 
irredentism, rogers Brubaker analyzes how state-led nationalization 
projects trigger support of national minorities from external national 
homelands, a process that may or may not involve violence.8 applied 
to the former Yugoslavia, this triadic analysis shows why Croatia’s bid 
for independence (the nationalizing state) triggered calls for “Greater 
serbia” among the serbs in Croatia (the national minority) with the 
goal of joining serbia (the national homeland).
also mindful of the border-transgressing logic of ethnonationalist 
conflict, donald horowitz shows that externally supported irredentist 
campaigns are relatively rare, despite the frequent presence of structural 
conditions favoring such phenomena.9 Border revisionism carries with 
it considerable risks that invite caution on the part of possible sponsor-
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ing groups, especially if they are in charge of their own states. While 
geopolitical considerations usually trump ethnic loyalties, less drastic 
types of aid may be offered in cases that involve separatist groups. Even 
at this moderate level, which falls well short of irredentism, the fear of 
conflict contagion may dissuade many kin groups from lending a help-
ing hand to secessionist minorities.
despite the suggestive logic of these border-transgressing mecha-
nisms, the qualitative literature on ethnonationalist conflict offers little 
by way of systematic empirical assessments of a general effect on con-
flict likelihood. ironically enough, the quantitative literature turns out 
to be equally uninformative. as we have argued above, this lacuna is 
caused by the tendency of political economists both to downplay eth-
nicity and to use comparative designs that exclude neighborhood ef-
fects and dependence among observations.
the first of these two tendencies can be understood in the context 
of the predominantly materialist logic propounded by political econo-
mists. Eager to show that materialist, economic explanations trump 
cultural, identity-related arguments, some of these scholars argue that 
civil wars are driven predominantly by individual rebels’ opportunity 
costs in terms of employment and by warlords’ personal enrichment 
through looting of raw materials such as diamonds and oil.10 another 
influential argument shifts the materialist logic from the individual level 
to the level of political institutions, postulating that internal conflict is 
likely to erupt in weakly governed states that are unable to project their 
territorial control, especially in rough terrain.11 according to these in-
terpretations, it is greed or the logic of insurrection that causes civil 
wars rather than ethnic or other grievances. in brief, conflict erupts for 
opportunistic, self-interested reasons rather than for political motives 
or idealistic, high-minded projects such as nationalism.
most scholars within this research tradition operationalize ethnicity 
by relying on the ethnolinguistic fractionalization index (elf). Based 
on the herfindahl index, this measure indicates the likelihood of two 
individuals in a country not belonging to the same ethnic group.12 Yet 
ethnonationalist civil wars clearly are not the aggregated effects of in-
dividual-level processes. it remains unclear, then, how and whether at 
all this measure is related to conflict.13 Furthermore, the alleged irrel-
10  Collier and hoeffler 2004; for an overview, see ross 2006.
11  Fearon and laitin 2003.
12  taylor and hudson 1972.
13  Cederman and Girardin 2007.
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evance of ethnicity may not be robust even measured in terms of the 
elf index. this measure of diversity can be shown to be significantly re-
lated to conflict in studies using alternative nonlinear specifications or 
conflict data sets that include violent conflict at a lower level than that 
of the customary threshold of one thousand battle deaths suggested by 
the Correlates of War project.14
although it is possible to construct theoretically more satisfactory 
country-level measures of ethnic exclusion that appear to have an in-
fluence on conflict,15 the best way to establish the relevance of ethno-
nationalist conflict mechanisms is to disaggregate the analysis down to 
the group level. this also avoids the aggregation problem in country-
level studies, which simply ignore all variation between groups within 
countries and disregard all instances of groups without conflict with 
governments in countries where we see conflict for one group. intro-
ducing a disaggregated model that features geocoded center-periphery 
dyads, Buhaug, Cederman, and rød are able to show that the prob-
ability of ethnonationalist civil wars increases with the excluded group’s 
relative demographic size, its distance from the capital, and the rough-
ness of the terrain within its settlement area.16
Based on these results, we have good reason to believe that the in-
visibility of ethnicity in conventional studies depends on improperly 
specified, overaggregated research designs. in contrast, the second gap 
afflicting the literature pertains to underaggregated, statecentric analy-
sis that does not even attempt to measure transborder effects or, if this 
is done, that uses very imprecise regional indicators.
most comparative analyses have treated individual countries as inde-
pendent observations where conflict may or may not occur. however, 
we have strong theoretical reasons to believe that the risk of civil war 
can be influenced by international and transnational features ignored 
by these studies. many have pointed out that civil wars appear to cluster 
regionally and that certain regions appear particularly conflict prone in 
specific time periods. although such clustering could stem from simi-
larities in the attributes among the countries that make them all the 
more likely to experience civil war, there may also be a more funda-
14  see sambanis 2004; hegre and sambanis 2006. researchers have also used alternative concep-
tions of ethnic relations, including polarization (see Esteban and ray 1994; montalvo and reynal-
Querol 2005) or dominance measures based on the share of the second largest ethnic group or all 
groups other than the dominant (e.g., Ellingsen 2000; and Vanhanen 1999). We focus our discussion 
on the elf index here since this is the most prominent measure and these alternative measures also 
suffer from similar problems for country-level data.
15  see Cederman and Girardin 2007.
16  Buhaug, Cederman, and rød 2008.
408 world politics 
mental spatial dependence at play among the observations, where the 
risk of civil war increases for states that are either exposed to, or have 
particular ties to, other countries involved in civil conflicts. ties to an-
other state with an active or latent conflict can facilitate insurgent mo-
bilization through the ability to raise resources, personnel, or military 
equipment.17 likewise, groups may become more likely to engage in 
violence if they observe successful insurgencies in other states that can 
serve as models for emulation.18 Furthermore, the spillover effects or 
externalities of conflict such as economic recessions and refugees may 
serve to increase the risk of conflict in other affected areas.19
although much of the existing work on the role of international fac-
tors in civil war has focused on the diffusion implications of ongoing 
conflict in another state, there are many consequences for conflict that 
may apply in the presence of transborder ties, irrespective of whether 
we actually see conflict in the other state. For example, ethnic kin may 
support or finance insurgencies in other states in instances where they 
are not aggrieved in the other state or have no interest in rebelling 
against their own government.20 Poor relations between states may pro-
vide governments with incentives to foster insurgencies in other states 
to undermine rivals; or poor relations may encourage rebellion if insur-
gents expect to receive support from outside parties.21
there are a number of empirical studies that provide strong support 
for the importance of border-transgressing factors. When the World 
Bank commissioned a set of case studies to evaluate the Collier and 
hoeffler model,22 many of the contributors found that international 
factors appeared very important in accounting for conflict onset, despite 
being largely absent in Collier and hoeffler’s original work.23 a num-
ber of statistical studies have shown that the positive conflict-clustering 
effect does not disappear when controlling for well-known predictors 
of civil war and survives various robustness tests, including unmeasured 
heterogeneity and systematic sample differences on observed charac-
teristics. hence, this cannot be dismissed as an artifact of the clustering 
of similar country characteristics.24 a number of studies confirm that 
interstate relations influence the risk of civil war onset as well as the 
17  see, for example, Gleditsch 2007; and salehyan and Gleditsch 2006.
18  ayres and saideman 2000.
19  sandler and murdoch 2004.
20  davis and moore 1997.
21  Gleditsch 2007; Kuperman and Crawford 2006; thyne 2007.
22  Collier and hoeffler 2004.
23  Collier and sambanis 2005a, 2005b; sambanis 2004.
24  Buhaug and Gleditsch 2008.
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likelihood of interventions in ongoing civil war.25 although there are 
in principle many transborder ties that could be relevant in civil war, 
existing empirical studies suggest that ethnic ties are among the most 
prominent linkages that can be mobilized in civil wars.26
While this incipient research on cross-border linkages in civil war is 
very encouraging, it still suffers from a number of shortcomings result-
ing from its reliance on highly aggregate country-level analysis. some 
studies have used very crude proxies of external ethnic ties that lack 
face validity. Collier and hoeffler,27 for example, look at the size of 
immigrant communities from a given country in the united states as 
a measure of opportunities for support from diasporas. this is a highly 
problematic measure, as it ignores all communities not in the u.s. and 
may pick up on refugee populations that are a result of previous or on-
going conflict rather than a prior cause of conflict onset. Furthermore, 
most of the existing studies on the role of transborder ethnic com-
munities have simply considered whether countries with such groups 
are more likely to see conflict,28 but they have not actually examined 
whether the transborder group itself was involved in the rebellion. 
most studies have been conducted at the country level; they therefore 
encounter the common problems of overaggregation and treating con-
flict and nonconflict cases nonsymmetrically. more specifically, a single 
instance of a transborder group and a conflict in a state (say india) will 
be taken as support for the theory, even if there may be a very large 
number of other border-transgressing groups in the same state that 
do not rebel—and therefore should be counted as evidence against the 
theory. overcoming this problem requires us to move down to the level 
of dyads of specific individual groups and their interactions with the 
government. Cetinyan provides one of the few fully dyadic studies of 
transborder groups using the minorities at risk (mar) data.29 although 
he does not find any effect of groups having ethnic kin on the risk of 
conflict, this finding may follow partly by construction, for reasons that 
we will return to later.
Existing studies of transborder ethnic ties in civil war have over-
looked the strong mediating role of geography and distance. although 
such ties in principle could extend over large distances,30 it seems rea-
25  austvoll 2005; Gleditsch 2007; salehyan 2009; thyne 2007.
26  austvoll 2005; saideman 2001.
27  Collier and hoeffler 2004.
28  For example, Gleditsch 2007.
29  Cetinyan 2003.
30  For example, shain and Barth 2003.
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sonable to assume that the cross-border ties most relevant for influ-
encing the risk of civil wars are those pertaining to groups that are 
geographically close. insurgents face many tactical advantages when 
operating from bases outside a country’s territorial boundaries, since it 
is costly for governments to pursue rebels across borders and violate the 
sovereignty of other states, but these military advantages to insurgents 
dissipate over large geographical distances. Geographically close com-
munities are likely to have a denser web of contact and communication 
than more distant ones. Existing studies of international factors in civil 
war suggest that geographical linkages are very important. the risk of 
civil war increases when a neighboring state is fighting a civil war but is 
not affected by conflict in distant countries.31 moreover, salehyan and 
Gleditsch show that, although refugees from neighboring countries ap-
pear to augur a higher risk of conflict, there is no evidence that refugees 
from faraway areas are associated with civil war.32 many of the data 
sources used in previous research do not allow researchers to identify 
where other segments are located and to measure the distance between 
kin groups.
in sum, there are very strong reasons to believe that cross-border 
groups have an effect on the risk of civil conflict in center-periphery 
dyads, but at the same time this effect has been obscured by problems 
related to data deficiencies and improper modeling or research design.
theorizing ethnonationalist triads
our literature review has shown that it is difficult or even impossible 
to capture the effect of ethnic-kin groups based on conventional, coun-
try-level analysis. therefore, the first priority should be to construct 
a plausible baseline model of dyadic ethnonationalist conflict within 
a specific country; this will allow us to examine the triadic effects of 
linkages to kin groups in other states. We build directly on Buhaug, 
Cederman, and rød,33 who offer such a disaggregated dyadic model 
that focuses on ethnic groups’ access to power. 34 measuring the ef-
fect of ethnonationalist exclusion, they disaggregate both ethnicity and 
conflict to the level of explicitly geocoded center-periphery dyads. Each 
dyad is composed of an egip, that is, an ethnic group (or groups) in 
power, and a meg, that is, a marginalized ethnic group without access 
31  Buhaug and Gleditsch 2008.
32  salehyan and Gleditsch 2006.
33  Buhaug, Cederman, and rød 2008.
34  see Wimmer 2002.
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to executive power.35 illustrating these definitions, Figure 1 displays the 
basic center-periphery (bcp) configuration. the next section provides 
details on the operationalization of both notions.
 Within each dyadic relationship, Buhaug, Cederman, and rød pos-
tulate (1) that powerful ethnic groups excluded from power are most 
likely to mobilize around an ethnonationalist program and to initiate 
conflict against the government and conversely (2) that the govern-
ment will engage in repression to curb the power of such threatening 
contenders. thus, according to this formulation, civil wars occur when 
peripheral contenders to the government are powerful enough to chal-
lenge the center and sufficiently motivated to do so.36
the rebels’ opportunities and willingness to challenge the center are 
related to many factors. as a first cut, we follow Buhaug, Cederman, 
and rød in highlighting the demographic and geographic dimensions. 
other things being equal, it can be expected that larger groups will be 
able to stage successful collective action thanks to their superior num-
bers:
h1. the probability of conflict increases with the relative demo-
graphic size of the excluded group.
most obviously, this demographic effect depends on an opportunity-
driven mechanism that can be explained in terms of resource mobili-
zation.37 however, the rebels’ willingness to act should increase with 
demographic size as well, because exclusion becomes normatively more 
problematic as the share of the excluded population increases, whether 
the political system is democratic or not. Permanent exclusion of large 
minorities, let alone, as is sometimes the case, of the majority of the 
population, represents powerful grievances that can trigger conflict.38
despite their central importance to any ethnographic configura-
tion, raw demographic size is likely to be an imperfect predictor of the 
power and motivations of marginalized ethnic groups. in particular, 
35  Cederman and Girardin 2007. note that this specification reifies the ethnic groups for empirical 
tractability reasons. thus, here we do not attempt to analyze the groups’ representatives and organiza-
tions, which constitute the actual locus of agency. For a critique of group reification, see Cederman 
2002; and Brubaker 2004.
36  Gurr 2000.
37  mcCarthy and Zald 1977; tilly 1978. We acknowledge that the ability of a group to successfully 
challenge the state can be influenced by resources other than demographic size and that some excluded 
groups may have far more or less power relative to the state than would be expected from their relative 
size, due to factors such as economic position or degree of group cohesion; see, for example, hechter 
1987. however, there are no systematic sources of data that would allow us to consider alternative 
resources, so we focus here on potential power as given by demographic size.
38  horowitz 1985; Petersen 2002; Wimmer 2002.
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even relatively small groups, such as the Chechens and the aceh, can 
stage surprisingly effective, long-lasting rebellions. on average, then, 
the prospects of peripheral challenges to the central government can be 
expected to be the most successful in the cases where the latter’s reach 
is least developed. We propose the following two hypotheses:
h2a. the probability of conflict increases with the distance between 
the excluded group and the capital.
h2b. the probability of conflict increases with the roughness of the 
terrain within the settlement area of the excluded group.
again, the causal mechanisms vary with both opportunity and willing-
ness. in the former sense, standard logistical arguments show how state 
capacity declines with increasing distance and geographic obstacles.39 
Beyond such straightforward materialist relationships, Buhaug, Ceder-
man, and rød suggest that the motivation of rebel groups also var-
ies with distance and terrain.40 rokkan’s multidimensional notion of 
“peripherality” suggests that ethnic groups that are far removed from 
the political center and live in inaccessible territories hold, on average, 
more hostile attitudes toward central rule than those that have been 
more thoroughly socialized to tolerate central control.41 in this regard, 
distance and remoteness can be thought of as indicators that cultural 
penetration by the central state is lacking.42
39  Boulding 1962.
40  Buhaug, Cederman, and rød 2008.
41  rokkan 1999.
42  Cederman 2008.
figure 1 
the basic center-periphery (bcp) configuration
 ethnonationalist triads 413
having summarized the dyadic baseline model based on the bcp 
configuration, we are now ready to extend it by introducing a third unit 
category, namely, that of the ethnic kin group, which is the potential 
deliverer of external support; see Figure 2. this extended center-pe-
riphery (ecp) configuration conforms directly to the triadic logic pro-
posed by Weiner and Brubaker.43 depending on the presence of a kin 
relationship, assistance can come either from a peripheral group in the 
neighboring country or from this country’s egip, whether it is the only 
dominant group or part of the governmental coalition. accordingly, 
we classify the former transborder link as the symmetric type, because 
it connects two peripheries, and the latter one as the asymmetric type, 
because it links the periphery with the center of another state.
Why should the risk of conflict depend on whether a peripheral 
group has a link to cross-border kin? on the one hand, the ethnic-kin 
group may provide additional resources to a peripheral group and thus 
make the relative power balance more favorable to the peripheral group 
than would be apparent from the attributes of the group at the domes-
tic level. on the other hand, although there could be instances where 
transborder kin simply help contribute to resources that are “scarce” at 
the domestic level, it will often be the case that such groups can provide 
qualitatively different forms of resources and contributions to insurgen-
cies. since kin groups are based in other states, it will typically be much 
more difficult for the central government to target supporters of insur-
gency and deter contributions through severe repression than would be 
the case for groups fully contained within the territory controlled by 
the state. Furthermore, insurgencies that can seek shelter among kin 
on the other side of international boundaries and operate from extra-
territorial bases will be more difficult for governments to conclusively 
defeat. in this sense, cross-border links can provide insurgencies with 
many advantages beyond the direct aggregation or resource-pooling 
implications.
Based on the ecp configuration, we propose a series of hypotheses 
about the influence of the transborder relationship on conflict proba-
bilities within the core dyad. the simplest version introduces this influ-
ence as a constant effect, where border-transgressing groups generally 
increase the risk of violence. the justification for such an unconditional 
argument can be derived from noninstrumentalist interpretations of 
nationalism. For example, Connor claims that rationalistic and mate-
rialist approaches to ethnic nationalism “can be faulted principally for 
43  Weiner 1972; Brubaker 1996.
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their failure to reflect the emotional depth of national identity.”44 more 
specifically referring to external intervention in civil wars, holsti sug-
gests that “reasons of affinity and sentiment rather than . . . power or 
more hard-headed cost-benefit analyses.”45 such observations find at 
least partial support in heraclides’ comparative case studies of seces-
sion.46 most simply stated, this hypothesis can be stated as follows:
h3. the probability of conflict increases if the excluded group has 
ethnic kin in a neighboring state
there is, however, good reason to believe that such a hypothesis is 
too bluntly stated. indeed, most scholars are inclined to make their 
analysis of the ethnic-kin effect dependent on power-related consider-
ations. For example, in their study of “diaspora politics” in the former 
soviet union, King and melvin insist that
in the realm of ethnicity and international relations, identity politics is often 
more about politics than about identity. disputes over the allocation of scarce 
resources, competing visions of foreign policy directions, domestic political con-
tests, and other prosaic features of political life frequently trump any putative 
duty that political elites might feel toward individuals who share their language 
or culture beyond their own frontiers.47
44  Connor 1994, 206.
45  holsti 1996, 127.
46  heraclides 1990.
47  King and melvin 1999–2000, 109.
figure 2 
the extended center-periphery (ecp) configuration
Kin-group 
support
symmetric link
asymmetric link
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Whether of the symmetric or asymmetric type, intervention in eth-
nonationalist civil wars is a risky business even if the assistance falls 
below outright irredentist warfare. For one, groups that are weak at the 
outset will face a major risk of escalation by trying to challenge govern-
ments through violence even if they count on the support of transbor-
der groups. in addition there may be carry-on effects of unsuccessful 
insurgencies in other states. horowitz’s classic study Ethnic Groups in 
Conflict still offers the most subtle analysis of these considerations.48 
Focusing on separatist ethnic conflict, this work highlights a number of 
reasons why cross-border bonds often remain inactive despite consider-
able minority mobilization and possibly even violent ethnonationalist 
conflict:
trans-border ethnic affinities more often promote restraint in supporting sepa-
ratists or intervention in behalf of a central government fighting to suppress 
separatism. Fear of contagion and domino effects is widespread. among sepa-
ratists, this creates a fear that the failure of a movement in one state will hurt 
movements in others—hence the ties among them. among states, fear of the 
success of separatism works in the opposite direction.49
how can this caution be empirically assessed? the most obvious way 
to do so is to measure the power of the meg that is to receive support in 
order to discriminate between plausible and less plausible challengers at 
the outset. Before deciding to offer assistance to ethnic kin, members of 
the external kin group have to evaluate the chances of success. accord-
ingly, horowitz points out that “there is a certain circularity involved 
in securing foreign support in the first place. no foreign state will risk 
committing itself to a movement that appears weak.”50
in addition to the implications of demographic balance for the pros-
pects for success, it will also generally be the case that larger excluded 
groups can claim more legitimate political grievances than smaller ones, 
thus adding to the radicalizing effect of external kin groups.51 this may 
increase the identification of transborder kin groups with their cause 
and make it easier to mobilize political support. Furthermore, it is gen-
erally easier for governments in other states to allow active support for 
insurgencies perceived as legitimate.
in operational terms, the most straightforward test of this power-
48  horowitz 1985.
49  horowitz 1985, 274–75.
50  horowitz 1985, 272.
51  see Jenne 2007.
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sensitive mechanism combines hypotheses h1 and h3 interactively in 
the following way:
h4. the ethnic-kin effect on conflict increases in proportion to the 
excluded group’s relative demographic weight in the primary dyad.
our expectation is that this hypothesis, rather than h3, will be empiri-
cally confirmed.52
Finally, we need to consider the nature of the external group. at least 
in principle, it could matter a great deal whether it is another peripheral 
group in a symmetric link or a central actor in an asymmetric relation-
ship. other things being equal, there can be no doubt that groups that 
control state resources, such as egips, are more powerful than those 
that do not. We know from existing research that interstate disputes 
between states are particularly likely when an excluded group is politi-
cally privileged in other states.53
direct interventions against another state are explicit acts of aggres-
sion and pose large risks for governments. this will in turn make less 
direct forms of support for insurgents more attractive, but the effects 
on civil war are still ambiguous. it is not obvious whether the willing-
ness of egips to support insurgencies is higher than that of excluded 
kin groups: “Even where ethnic affinities relate, not to peripheral mi-
norities in the external state, but to centrally influential groups, sup-
port is by no means automatic.”54 there are many reasons why state 
governments may be more cautious than actors from nonstate groups. 
most obviously, territorial revisionism can come back to haunt its 
state-based promoter. multiethnic states that have problems control-
ling their own minorities must typically think twice before supporting 
rebellions in neighboring states. more generally, international norms 
governing interstate relations are biased in favor of stability and non-
intervention. their impact has been most clearly observed in the case 
of sub-saharan africa,55 but it is likely to apply to other parts of the 
world as well.56 Caution also derives from the fear that cross-border 
assistance may likewise lead to unwanted turmoil spreading across state 
borders into the territory of the intervening state. Furthermore, when 
52  a pure aggregation effect would suggest that the risk of conflict should hinge on the size of this 
transnational kin group. however, the fact that transnational kin can provide qualitatively different 
forms of resources suggests that the risk of conflict should increase even when transnational kin groups 
are not necessarily particularly large.
53  see davis and moore 1997; Gleditsch, salehyan, and schultz 2008.
54  horowitz 1985, 275.
55  herbst 1989.
56  Zacher 2001.
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potential external government support for excluded groups is known 
in advance, governments in countries experiencing conflict will face 
greater incentives to provide some form of accommodation to excluded 
groups, which in turn would make these groups less likely to resort to 
violence. While the arguments for a cautioning, countervailing effect 
on accommodation are strong, there is empirical evidence pointing in 
the opposite direction.57 thus, we state our hypothesis in favor of a 
stronger conflict-inducing impact in the asymmetric cases as compared 
with their symmetric counterparts.
h5. the risk of conflict increases if the kin group is governmental 
(egip) rather than another peripheral group (meg).
nevertheless, in the presence of the countervailing, power-enhancing 
influence of state power, it is hard to be certain of the net effect. to 
determine it more precisely, it would be necessary to consider further 
factors influencing supporting state’s calculations that unfortunately 
fall outside the scope of this study. a prominent example relates to 
the exact geographic location of the groups in question. horowitz ob-
serves that “external aid seems longest-lived when it comes, not from 
strong, established states with clear-cut interests, but from irregular 
forces across porous, remote borders.”58 moreover, risk-taking behavior 
can also be expected to vary with the nature of the interstate relations 
in question. While geopolitical rivalry could introduce temptations to 
weaken the other side through the transborder support of insurgen-
cies,59 stable democratic relations should make such interventions less 
likely.60
operationalizing ethnonationalist triads
in this section we describe the operational definitions of our variables. 
Because our analysis builds directly on the operationalization of the 
dyadic baseline model proposed by Buhaug, Cederman, and rød,61 we 
provide a short summary of the data used in that study before turning 
to the data on transborder ethnic affiliations. this dyadic setup traces 
conflict between ethnically defined state authorities, that is, the “ethnic 
group(s) in power,” and their challengers. in this connection, the spatial 
dimension is crucial, because it helps us not only to identify and locate 
57  saideman 2001.
58  horowitz 1985, 276.
59  saideman 2002.
60  Belanger, duchesne, and Paquin 2005; but see also saideman 2007.
61  Buhaug, Cederman, and rød 2008.
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the ethnic groups but also to estimate their demographic sizes. all in 
all, the extended triadic model relies on information along six dimen-
sions, the first five of which were covered by Buhaug, Cederman, and 
rød:
1. the identity and location of ethnic groups,
2. demographic group sizes,
3. ethnic group(s) in power,
4. geocoded data on distances and terrain,
5. ethnic dyadic conflicts, and
6. transborder ethnic affiliations.
in the following, we describe briefly the data-collection efforts before 
turning to the results of the analysis in the next section.
geocoding ethnic groups
in their choice of a basic data set on ethnic groups, Buhaug, Cederman, 
and rød rely on the well-known Atlas Narodov Mira (anm).62 the anm 
stems from a major project to chart ethnic groups undertaken by soviet 
ethnographers in the early 1960s. their efforts bore fruit in the exten-
sive but still untranslated atlas, covering the entire world. the anm has 
a number of strengths: it is complete and carefully researched, provides 
high-quality maps, relies on a consistent classification of ethnicity, and 
offers a uniform group list valid across state borders; this last item, in 
particular, is important for our research purposes. however, the anm 
is not without its problems. it is exclusively defined on the basis of 
linguistic criteria and therefore disregards many other often potentially 
important markers of ethnicity such as religion. it also contains many 
groups that are politically irrelevant and insufficiently mobilized to 
have any capacity for collective action. in particular, the anm list is often 
seen as problematic for identifying relevant ethnic groups in africa.63 
Finally, the anm data, based as they are on information from the 1960s, 
are clearly outdated in some cases.64 realizing that this choice of data 
source is far from uncontroversial, we nevertheless contend that the ad-
vantages outweigh the disadvantages, at least until a more suitable data 
set becomes available. in order to make the data of the anm available for 
statistical analysis, all of the Atlas’s maps were converted by scanning 
62  Bruk and apenchenko 1964.
63  E.g., Posner 2005.
64  moreover, the anm data do not reflect population changes due to migration or refugees. as 
such, the Kashmiris are considered to be present in india only, despite there reportedly being over one 
hundred thousand migrants from the province in Pakistan. however, in our case, this helps ensure that 
the data do not reflect population movements that may be in part a result of conflict.
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to a digital format. then, the digitized maps were geo-referenced as 
polygons, meaning that they were aligned with underlying gis coun-
try shapes for the period (1964). the resulting data set, labeled greg 
(Geo-referencing of Ethnic Groups), contains spatial information on 
the location of more than sixteen hundred ethnic groups identified in 
the anm.65
estimating group sizes as share of state populations
having determined the geographic location of all ethnic groups, the 
next task is to construct a suitable measure of the power balance in the 
center-periphery dyads. Because a number of states did not exist at the 
time of the atlas’s publication, such as the post-soviet republics of rus-
sia, Buhaug, Cederman, and rød propose a spatial estimation method 
based on an intersection of territorial country masks, the group poly-
gons, and population-density maps. using the boundaries in a country 
layer (shapefile) representing the post–cold war period as “cookie cut-
ters,” the method selects the group polygons (or parts thereof ) that fell 
within the borders of each state. the ethnic group layers were then 
intersected with a gridded population-density layer, making it possible 
to measure the size of the population that fell within a given ethnic 
group’s “state-cropped” polygon(s).66
identifying the ethnic group(s) in power
the notion of “ethnic group(s) in power” (egip) that we introduced 
above provides the crucial piece of information that makes the defini-
tion of ethnic dyads possible. in our empirical analysis, we follow Ced-
erman and Girardin in considering a group, or a coalition of groups, to 
be in power if their leaders serve (at least intermittently) in senior gov-
ernmental positions, especially within the cabinet.67 thus we focus on 
ethnic groups’ influence over the executive at the national level rather 
than on their legislative or local power. in addition to the ethnic back-
ground of senior cabinet members, specific institutional arrangements, 
such as different types of power sharing and consociationalism, may 
also be indicators of power inclusion. By power sharing, we mean any 
arrangement that divides the access to power among the groups mak-
ing up the governing coalition. accordingly, egips can consist of more 
than one group. For example, we code all the four language groups 
65  Weidmann, rød, and Cederman 2010.
66  For details on this procedure, see Buhaug, Cederman, and rød 2008.
67  Cederman and Giradin 2007.
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of switzerland as constituting the egip.68 Wherever deemed appropri-
ate, period-dependent egips were introduced as a way to capture major 
shifts in the political constellation of power access (see, for example, 
afghanistan and Yugoslavia). By definition, any group not coded as an 
egip is a marginalized ethnic group (meg). We can now form center-
periphery dyads as pairwise constellations of a country’s egip and each 
of its megs. Given the enormous difficulty of identifying egips in sub-
saharan africa, we limit the empirical sample to Eurasia and north 
africa, thus covering roughly half of the world’s states.
geocoding distances and terrain
hypotheses 2a and 2b call for geographic data on the distances be-
tween each meg and the corresponding capital, as well as the extent of 
mountainous terrain in their home regions. the location of the eth-
nic groups can be readily determined by means of geocoded polygons. 
Groups belonging to the egip are by default coded with the capital 
city as their location. For megs represented by two or more polygons, 
Buhaug, Cederman, and rød generated a weighted distance measure 
that gives the average centroid-capital distance for all locations of the 
group, weighted by the population size in each polygon. the popu-
lation weighting is necessary to prevent a distortion of distances due 
to small clusters far away from the group’s core settlement area. to 
reduce outlier influence and to account for an expected declining ef-
fect of distance with higher values, we take the natural logarithm of 
the distance variable. the second proxy for geographic opportunity and 
willingness—extent of mountainous terrain—was computed in a man-
ner similar to that of group populations. intersecting gridded mountain 
data with the boundaries of the ethnic groups yielded the share of the 
two-dimensional area of each polygon covered by mountains. the area-
weighted mountain variable takes on values between zero and one.
determining the onset of dyadic ethnic conflict
the final step of data generation for the dyadic baseline model concerns 
the dependent variable, namely, the outbreak of dyadic ethnic conflict. 
the main source was the ucdp/prio armed Conflicts dataset, hence-
forth acd,69 which is arguably the most established country-level data 
set on armed conflict thanks to its comparably low minimum casualty 
threshold of just twenty-five annual battle-related deaths and its sepa-
68  For a full list of egips, see Buhaug, Cederman, and rød 2008.
69  Gleditsch et al. 2002.
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rate coding of multiple simultaneous conflicts within single countries. 
using an operational definition of ethnic conflict that focuses on all 
conflicts in which the parties are organized primarily along ethnic lines, 
Buhaug, Cederman, and rød identified the megs that were involved in 
each ethnic conflict.70 in cases where more than one group challenged 
the capital at the same time, an onset of conflict was recorded in each of 
the corresponding dyads. ongoing years of conflict were coded as miss-
ing. in case of a lull in the fighting or a peace agreement that lasts for 
at least two consecutive calendar years, the next observation of conflict 
in the dyad was coded as a new onset.
transborder ethnic affiliations
Finally, we need to consider the data on external ethnic affiliations in 
some detail, because this dimension was not covered by the previous 
study. as already mentioned, we rely on the anm’s global group list, 
which facilitates the coding of transborder ethnic links. of course, 
there are many other data sources on ethnic affiliation, including Gurr’s 
minorities at risk (mar) data and Fearon’s more recent list of ethnic 
groups.71 although these data sources may be useful and appropri-
ate for many analyses or comparisons of individual ethnic groups, the 
most commonly used data sources on ethnic affiliation presents many 
limitations when it comes to identifying the cross-border presence of 
ethnic groups. these data sources typically do not have standardized 
group codes that are comparable across countries, and in many cases we 
find similar labels used for groups that may lack any common identity 
across national boundaries. For example, Fearon’s data identify “Black” 
as a separate ethnic group in Brazil, Canada, nicaragua, and uruguay, 
and—for unknown reasons—the label “Blacks” appears in Ecuador. in 
this case, it would clearly be problematic to treat English-, Portuguese-, 
and spanish-speaking blacks as one ethnic group with a transborder 
presence. likewise, the mar data identify “Foreigners” as a minority at 
risk in switzerland, but it would be highly problematic to treat “For-
eigners” as a cohesive group and assume linkages to communities in 
other states without further information about the specific composition 
of the group.
 although we believe that the anm data offer certain advantages over 
the alternatives, the list of ethnic groups in the anm data contain some 
of the problems noted above with regard to transborder comparability. 
70  Buhaug, Cederman, and rød 2008.
71  Gurr 1993; Fearon 2003.
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We have therefore made some changes to the data to facilitate mean-
ingful cross-national comparisons. in particular, all the ethnic groups 
in switzerland (that is, French swiss, German swiss, and italian swiss) 
are listed as separate ethnic groups in the anm, distinct from their kin 
in their respective nation-states, while Germans in Belgium and ital-
ians in Yugoslavia are considered “the same” as their kin in their respec-
tive nation states. For consistency, we recode all the swiss ethnic groups 
to the same group identifier as the ethnic groups in their respective 
nation-states and other neighboring countries. likewise, austrians are 
considered a distinct ethnic group from Germans in the anm, and we 
recode all instances of this in austria and elsewhere to Germans. Fur-
thermore, Jews in israel are considered a distinct ethnic group from 
Jews in other states, for example, russia or the ussr. We recode all 
Jews as the same ethnic group.
the most fundamental change that we make to the anm data pertains 
to the role of arabs. the anm data code arabs from different states in 
the middle East and north africa as separate ethnic groups. although 
we recognize the wide variation in spoken arabic and that the issue of 
a common arab identity is controversial among arabs, it seems prob-
lematic to assume that Palestinians in israel and arabs in iran have no 
ties to neighboring communities. moreover, many other encompass-
ing categories are included as single groups in the anm data, including 
Chinese, despite the large differences and lack of mutual intelligibility 
between dialects such as mandarin and Cantonese within the greater 
Chinese macrolanguage. We therefore include all arab groups as a sin-
gle ethnic group to ensure meaningful border-transgressing linkages.
empirical estimates and results
to test our hypotheses on the onset of ethnic conflict, we consider a 
series of regression models. our basic unit of analysis is a basic center-
periphery (bcp) dyad composed of an excluded peripheral group (meg) 
paired against the center or government of a state (egip). We limit our-
selves to ethnic groups that encompass at least fifty thousand individu-
als in a state. our dependent variable is the onset of an ethnic conflict 
in a peripheral group, as defined in the previous section. We consider 
two different samples in our analysis. our first is a static data set for 
which we have one observation per dyad. We investigate whether the 
dyad experiences conflict at any time during the period 1945–2005 (or 
the period of a state’s existence for dyads in countries that cease to exist 
as independent states prior to 2005), with values for the independent 
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variables based on the characteristics prevailing at the beginning of the 
period.
static analysis
our static data contain 541 center-periphery dyads in sixty countries 
in Europe and asia. Panel data often tend to violate the assumption 
of constant variances, given the stacked structure of the data. our data 
have a panel structure where not only are the individual observations 
pooled over time for each dyad and across space, but multiple dyads 
may also originate within the same country. this in turn makes it likely 
that we may have large variation across individual dyads and countries, 
and we therefore report huberized robust standard error estimates, 
clustering on countries.72
our first model—model 1 in table 1—is essentially a replication of 
the empirical operationalization of the bcp model proposed by Buhaug, 
Cederman, and rød.73 the right-hand-side variables considered in-
clude the demographic balance of the peripheral group to the egip, the 
distance of the group from the capital, the extent to which the group 
populates mountainous terrain, and the per capita income of the coun-
try at large. more specifically, the measure of the dyadic power balance 
between the egip and the marginalized group is operationalized using 
the share of the periphery’s population sp relative to the population of 
the egip sc, or more precisely ln[sp /(sp+sc)]. relatively larger excluded 
groups have higher rates. the measure is logged due to the skewed 
nature of the ratio, as most peripheral groups are considerably smaller 
than the center. Furthermore, using the logged rate implies that the ef-
fect of further increases in group size declines as the size of the group 
grows larger. as specified above, the distance from the capital is mea-
sured using the logged distance from the geographical centroid of the 
polygon for each ethnic group to a country’s capital. the mountain 
share measure indicates the proportion of the polygon for an ethnic 
group that is composed of “mountainous terrain.” Finally, we consider 
the national-level per capita income, given the attention that this has 
received in the cross-country comparative literature.74
72  most of our explanatory variables are dyad specific, and it could be argued that we should cluster 
on individual dyads or consider possible differences across dyads rather than countries. Group-level 
clustering leads to standard error estimates generally much smaller than those found for clustering on 
countries. hence, the country-level robust standard error estimates should be regarded as the more 
conservative estimates.
73  Buhaug, Cederman, and rød 2008.
74  We refer to Buhaug, Cederman, and rød 2008 for further details and discussion of data sources 
and definitions for these control variables.
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the results for model 1 shown in table 1 are very similar to those 
reported by Buhaug, Cederman, and rød,75 thus confirming hypoth-
eses h1, h2a, and h2b. dyads with larger peripheral ethnic groups are 
much more likely to see the onset of an ethnic conflict. Furthermore, 
violent conflict is significantly more likely for dyads with excluded eth-
nic groups that are far from the center or the capital of the state. Groups 
that populate a greater share of mountainous terrain are also more likely 
to be involved in civil conflict. at the dyadic level, once we have taken 
into account the demographic balance and the geographical position of 
the group, national-level gdp per capita income no longer has a statisti-
cally significant negative impact on the likelihood of conflict.
75  Buhaug, Cederman, and rød 2008.
table 1
logit estimates of the probability of ethnic conflict onset,  
static samplea
Variable Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4
Group-Level Variables
ln demographic balance 4 0.471 0.489 0.254 0.260
 (0.135)*** (0. 143)*** (0. 189)* (0.185)*
ln distance from capital 0.506 0.487 0.481 0.503
 (0.189)*** (0.188)*** (0.180)*** (0.201)***
mountain share 0.810 0.781 0.829 0.848
 (0.388)** (0.377)** (0.424)** (0.433)*
Transnational Variables
Contiguous transnational group  –0.289 2.341 2.249
  (0.466) (1.326)** (1.294)**
ln dem. balance X contiguous group   0.658 0.653
   (0.265)*** (0.260)***
transnational group EGiP    0.226
    (0.631)
Country-Level Variables
ln GdP per capita (lagged) –0.122 –0.106 –0.157 –0.176
 (0.242) (0.256) (0.252) (0.239)
intercept –2.816 –2.592 –3.414 –3.399
 (2.273) (2.282) (2.430)* (2.403)*
n 541 541 541 541
Wald χ2 21.38 21.72 26.21 26.93
* p < 0.1; ** p < 0.05; *** p < 0.01 (one-tailed)
a Entries are logit coefficient estimates, with standard errors in parentheses.
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as a test of hypothesis h3, model 2 introduces a dichotomous mea-
sure of whether the excluded ethnic group has transborder kin in an-
other state. For reasons explained above, we limit ourselves to groups 
that are located in states within five hundred kilometers of one another, 
using data on the minimum distances between states.76 We also disre-
gard groups that have a small transborder contingent, encompassing 
fewer than fifty thousand individuals, and code these as not having 
a cross-border presence. as can be seen, the coefficient estimate for 
the simple dichotomous indicator of transborder presence is actually 
negative, although not statistically significant. hence, as we expected, 
our results do not provide any support for h3, that is, the idea that 
transborder excluded groups are generally more likely to rebel, even 
after taking into account other dyadic characteristics that make groups 
more likely to become involved in violence against the center of a state 
or the government. Comparing the likelihood ratios or the Wald χ2 
for the two models indicates that adding the dichotomous measure for 
whether groups have a cross-border presence does not yield a statisti-
cally significant increase in the overall fit of the model.
as specified by hypothesis h4, model 3 also includes an interactive 
term between the dyadic demographic balance and whether a group 
has a transborder presence. this specification reflects our argument 
that the border-transgressing linkages can increase the risk of conflict, 
but only conditional on dyadic characteristics likely to be associated 
with conflict. as can be seen, we find a large significant positive coef-
ficient for the interactive term. substantively, the results for model 3 
imply that although larger groups are more likely to become engaged 
in violence with the center, the effect of increases in the demographic 
power balance is much greater for groups that have a cross-border pres-
ence. Comparing the Wald χ2 for models 1 and 3 indicates that the 
addition of the terms for contiguous transborder groups and the in-
teraction between border-transgressing groups and the demographic 
power balance makes a significant contribution and improves notably 
on the baseline model 1. this provides strong support for our argument 
that transborder links can dramatically increase the risk of civil war, 
but only in dyads where the transborder link combines with domestic 
characteristics that make violence more likely.
the net impact of a variable that enters a regression model with an 
interactive term will depend on the value of the other variable in the 
interactive term, as well as the scaling of the two individual variables or 
76  Gleditsch et al. 2008.
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raw components of the interactive term.77 Figure 3 graphically presents 
the net effects of differences in the demographic ratio on the predicted 
probability of conflict in a center-periphery dyad implied by the base-
line model 1 and model 3 with the interactive term, for groups with and 
without a cross-border presence. all other covariates in the model are 
held at their median values. the thin dashed line indicates the predic-
tions from the baseline model 1, where we disregard whether groups 
have a transborder presence. the longer dashed line indicates the pre-
dicted probabilities from model 3 for a group without a transborder 
presence in any neighboring country, while the solid line indicates 
how the predicted probabilities from model 3 change with the demo-
graphic balance for a group with kin in a neighboring state. as can be 
seen, the increase in the risk of civil war in larger group sizes is indeed 
much more pronounced for groups that have transborder kin in model 
3. moreover, model 3 yields notably higher predicted probabilities for 
relatively larger groups with a cross-border presence than the purely 
domestically oriented model 1. Consider, for example, the case of the 
Kurds in turkey, where the center-periphery dyad has a demographic 
balance ratio of about 0.136. Based on the other values for this dyad, 
the estimates for model 1 imply a predicted probability of conflict of 
about 0.32. By contrast, model 3 implies a higher predicted probability 
of conflict—that is, 0.43—given the presence of Kurds in neighboring 
iran, iraq, and syria. the appendix lists all groups with transborder kin 
involved in conflict, ordered by the demographic balance ratio.
as foreseen by hypothesis h5, model 4 adds a term indicating 
whether the peripheral group in a dyad is an egip or ethnic group in 
power in at least one of the contiguous states in which it is present. 
although the results indicate a positive coefficient, this does not reach 
statistical significance and is not distinguishable from zero. this is con-
sistent with our discussion above.
so far we have seen that the terms for border-transgressing charac-
teristics in model 3 when added to the purely domestic dyadic baseline 
model 1 are clearly statistically significant, and that the introduction of 
the transborder features in model 3 can generate quite different pre-
dictions. however, is there any evidence that the predictions of model 
3 are generally more accurate than those of model 1, in the sense of 
assigning higher predicted probabilities to cases in which we observe 
conflict and assigning lower probabilities to those in which we do not?
77  see Braumoeller 2004.
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neither model 3, with the interaction between demographic bal-
ance and transborder kin, nor the baseline model 1 returns predicted 
probabilities above 0.5—that is, instances where conflict is predicted to 
be more likely than not—for any dyad where we actually observe con-
flict.78 however, since conflict is a rare event that occurs in only about 
10 percent of the 541 dyads in our sample, it may be more appropriate 
to consider whether the model does a good job of identifying a higher 
likelihood of conflict and helps in discriminating between those dyads 
within which we actually see conflict and those within which we do 
not. if an event is very rare, we can typically maximize the share of 
78  the baseline model 1 does not generate predicted probabilities above 0.5 for any groups. model 
3 does yield predicted probabilities above 0.5 for two dyads ( Jhats/awans in Pakistan and russians in 
Kazakhstan), but neither of these groups is actually involved in conflict.
figure 3 
predicted probability of conflict by demographic balance rate for 
a median dyad profile, static sample
0.8
0.6
0.4
0.2
0.0
Pr
. C
on
fli
ct
 o
ns
et
0.0                       0.2                      0.4                      0.6                      0.8
demographic Balance rate
model 4 w/ transnational group
model 4 w/o transnational group
base model 1
428 world politics 
correct predictions by simply assuming that the event will never oc-
cur. in practice, however, we generally prefer to know whether certain 
features are associated with the rare events and therefore help identify 
when these events are more likely. the state Failure task Conflict task 
Force, for example, considered a prediction threshold of 0.25 in its ef-
forts to forecast failing states. For a prediction threshold of 0.25, model 
3 correctly identifies nine out of the fifty-five dyadic conflicts, while 
model 1 correctly identifies only five conflicts.79
From a decision-theoretic viewpoint, the appropriate prediction 
threshold C depends on the relative costs of a false negative or on a case 
for which a true event is not predicted and the costs of a false positive 
or an incorrect prediction of the event in an instance where it does not 
happen. a low threshold minimizes the missed events but risks gener-
ating an unacceptable number of false positives. rather than choosing 
a single-prediction threshold, we could evaluate whether there are sys-
tematic differences between models across a range of plausible thresh-
olds. King and Zheng suggest using receiver-operating-Characteristic 
(roc) plots to compare the performance of two competing models over 
a range of prediction threshold Cs.80 an roc plot plots a continuous 
curve comparing the share of true and false positives from a model 
for a given prediction threshold. the performance of a model relative 
to a random guess based on the share of events in the sample can be 
assessed by comparing the height of the curve to a 45 degree line. Fig-
ure 4 shows roc plots for model 1 (dashed line) and model 3 (solid 
line). With a few isolated exceptions, the curve for model 3 is gener-
ally higher than that of model 1, and the difference is quite substantial 
in most of the relevant areas of the curve, suggesting that transborder 
characteristics provide important information in identifying the center 
periphery dyads within which conflict is more common.
dynamic analysis
so far we have considered only a static analysis where each center-
periphery dyad is observed once and we consider whether conflict oc-
curs at any point. however, conflicts may be more or less frequent, and 
many of the features in our model can change over time. in particular, 
79  more specifically, in addition to those conflicts identified by model 1, model 3 correctly predicts 
conflict in the center periphery dyads involving azerbaijanis and Kurds in iran, Kurds in turkey, 
Baloch in Pakistan, and shan in myanmar. all of these groups have transnational kin. the number of 
false positives is the same for both models, so model 3 improves on the predictions of model 1 without 
increasing the number of incorrectly called conflicts.
80  King and Zheng 2001.
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groups may become included or excluded, and demographic balances 
may be changed by border changes and changes in the state system. ta-
ble 2 replicates models 1–4 for a sample of annual dyadic observations, 
where we consider how the covariates in the model predict the onset of 
conflict in a given year. since the risk of conflict is likely to be highly 
dependent on whether a dyad has experienced conflict previously, we 
include a count of the length of time that a dyad has remained at peace, 
using a cubic smoothing spline to allow for possible time dependence 
as suggested by Beck, Katz, and tucker.81 We also include a linear time 
trend. as can be seen from table 2, the conclusions from the analysis 
based on the static sample are generally upheld in the dynamic analysis, 
with the exception that the negative coefficient for the log of per capita 
gdp now becomes significantly negative in the baseline model without 
the border-transgressing variables.
81  Beck, Katz, and tucker 1998.
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more specifically, model 6 with the dichotomous term for whether 
groups have a transborder presence still indicates that conflict is not 
generally more likely for such groups, again disconfirming hypothesis 
h3. however, the interactive specification in model 7 still suggests a 
strong interactive effect between demographic balance and cross-border 
table 2
logit estimates of the probability of ethnic conflict onset,  
dyadic samplea 
Variable Model 5 Model 6 Model 7 Model 8
Group-Level Variables
ln demographic balance r 0.399 0.430 0.224 0.215
 (0.135)*** (0. 145)*** (0. 190) (0.189)
ln distance from capital 0.602 0.547 0.545 0.508
 (0.135)*** (0.124)*** (0.119)*** (0.115)***
mountain share 1.135 1.114 1.012 0.955
 (0.305)*** (0.310)*** (0.287)*** (0.262)***
Transnational Variables
Contiguous transnational group  –0.446 1.716 1.892
  (0.420) (1.273)* (1.285)*
ln dem. balance X contiguous group   0.574 0.595
   (0.250)** (0.256)**
transnational group EGiP    –0.415
    (0.434)
Country-Level and Control Variables
ln GdP per capita (lagged) –0.289 –0.274 –0.301 –0.288
 (0.263)* (0.282) (0.299) (0.289)
Year 0.065 0.067 0.064 0.065
 (0.010)*** (0.011)*** (0.011)*** (0.011)***
Peaceyears –0.271 –0.267 –0.261 –0.259
 (0.067)*** (0.062)*** (0.065)*** (0.066)***
spline1 –0.001 –0.001 –0.001 –0.001
 (<0.001)*** (<0.001)** (<0.001)*** (<0.001)**
spline2 <0.001 –0.001 –0.001 –0.001
 (<0.001)** (<0.001)** (<0.001)** (<0.001)**
spline3 >–0.001 <0.001 <0.001 >–0.001
 (<0.001) (<0.001) (<0.001) (<0.001) 
intercept –132.906 –135.398 –130.995 –133.020
 (18.820)*** (19.621)*** (21.032)*** (20.125)***
n 22,961 22,961 22,961 22,961
Wald χ2 374.39 383.71 521.36 615.78
* p < 0.1; ** p < 0.05; *** p < 0.01 (one-tailed)
a Entries are logit coefficient estimates, with standard errors in parentheses.
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presence, thus lending support to hypothesis h4. Finally, with respect 
to hypothesis h5, the coefficient estimate for whether the group is egip 
in any of the neighboring states now actually returns a negative coef-
ficient estimate, although this is not statistically significant.
Figure 5 displays the implied predictions for the dyadic model for a 
median dyad profile. Conflict is a very rare event in our sample of an-
nual observations (less than 0.5 percent of the observations), and given 
the strong time dependence, the predicted probability of conflict will be 
low in a dyad with the median value of successive years of peace in our 
sample, which is twenty-four years. however, although the absolute 
predicted probabilities of conflict are obviously much lower, the relative 
differences between the predictions for different dyad profiles given 
domestic and cross-border specifications are similar to what we found 
in the static analysis.
We have also conducted a number of robustness checks. First, we 
have examined a version of model 3 using the size of the transborder 
group rather than the binary indicator to examine whether the risk of 
conflict increases with the absolute size of the transborder group. We 
find no evidence, however, for the specification according to which the 
effect depends on the size of the border-transgressing component of 
the group. second, we have experimented with alternative group size 
thresholds to see whether our results depend on the specific criterion. 
doubling the cutoff threshold to one hundred thousand, however, does 
not lead to results that differ notably from those found with a thresh-
old of fifty thousand. third, we have reestimated the model using all 
transborder groups rather than just groups in countries within five hun-
dred kilometers of the outer boundaries of countries. in our Eurasian 
sample only a relatively low share—about 5.5 percent—of the observa-
tions with transborder groups have no kin in a neighboring state. as 
such, the results do not look remarkably different when we include all 
groups, although we strongly believe that geographical dimensions are 
very important. Fourth, to check whether our results might reflect the 
capabilities of states where kin groups are located, we also conducted 
additional robustness tests adding the capabilities of the kin states as 
well as the ratio of kin state capabilities to those of the countries in 
question. the capabilities of kin states are in our view a poor proxy for 
the potential capabilities of transborder groups, since there is no reason 
to expect that ethnic groups can rely on the resources of states where 
their kin are located. however, adding this does not change our main 
results—the coefficient estimate for the capabilities of states with kin is 
negative, but not statistically significant.
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conclusion
in this article we have demonstrated that border-crossing ethnic affili-
ations have a considerable impact on the likelihood of ethnonational 
civil wars. Furthermore, our findings indicate that rather than being 
automatic and given by the presence of matching ethnic identities, this 
effect depends directly on the power balance in the primary conflict 
dyad.
We believe that this research represents considerable progress as 
compared with the prevailing quantitative literature, whose statecentric 
research designs have generally failed to capture triadic ethnonation-
alist configurations. By tracing conflict at the dyadic level, our study 
disaggregates the analysis to the group level, while at the same time 
extending the focus across state borders. in doing so, the present ap-
figure 5 
predicted probability of conflict by demographic balance rate for a 
median dyad profile, dynamic sample
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proach enables more precise testing of relational mechanisms in triadic 
ethnic configurations that have thus far been only explicitly treated by 
qualitative research on ethnonationalism.
although these results are promising, they are not intended to sug-
gest that the last word has been had about the influence of ethnic kin 
on conflict. Future research will tell us whether our conclusions are ro-
bust beyond the current sample, which is limited to Eurasia and north 
africa. in principle, it is possible to incorporate other parts of the world 
using the current data, but the difficulties of establishing reliable cod-
ing of ethnic-kin relationships, especially in sub-saharan africa, are so 
serious that we deem it more fruitful to rely on alternative data sources. 
thanks to the new data set on Ethnic Power relations, we will be able 
in the future to extend the sample to the rest of the world while at the 
same time limiting it to politically relevant ethnic groups and assessing 
their access to power over time in a more precise manner than was pos-
sible in this study.82 the geographic dimension could also be explored 
more fully. We would expect transborder support to be dependent on 
geographic factors, very much as seems to be the case in domestic 
dyads. such possibilities include the effect of borders, distances be-
tween relevant groups, and terrain. more generally, additional research 
is needed on the details of the border-transgressing bond, especially 
as regards the nature of the actor-specific mechanism. disaggregated 
research designs, such as those employed by Cunningham, Gleditsch, 
and salehyan,83 will be able to tell us what drives conflict—whether 
refugee camps, arms smuggling, demonstration effects, irredentist for-
eign policies, or other types of external interventions.
For the time being, however, we conclude that ethnicity matters in 
civil wars and that its influence is felt beyond state borders. attempts 
to overlook such mechanisms are likely to block scientific progress and 
may lead to dangerously distorted policy advice.
82  see min, Cederman, and Wimmer 2008.
83  Cunningham, Gleditsch, and salehyan 2009.
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appendix
groups with transborder Kin (+50,000) involved in conflict,  
ordered by dyadic power balance
Country Group Dyadic Power Balance
israel arabs (Palestinians) 0.364
macedonia albanians 0.208
iran azerbaijanis 0.192
iraq Kurds 0.174
iran Kurds 0.160
turkey Kurds 0.136
iran arabs 0.112
moldova ukrainians 0.109
Yugoslavia albanians 0.088
myanmar shan 0.083
myanmar Karen 0.073
Croatia serbs 0.071
Pakistan Baloch 0.070
spain Basques 0.069
azerbaijan armenians 0.045
myanmar/Burma mon (talaing) 0.037
ussr azerbaijanis 0.035
Georgia ossetians 0.028
myanmar Kachins 0.023
ussr armenians 0.016
myanmar Wa 0.004
united Kingdom irish 0.002
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